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In October 1839 a secret cabinet meeting was held by the British government at Windsor 
Castle. Among those included were the prime minister, Lord Melbourne, the foreign 
secretary, Viscount Palmerston, the president of the Board of Control, overseeing the 
governance of the Indian government, John Cam Hobhouse, and the newly-appointed 
secretary of war, classical scholar, historian, poet and essayist, Thomas Babington Macaulay. 
At that meeting a crucial decision was taken to dispatch a naval and military expedition from 
British Bengal to Qing China to obtain redress by force for a perceived series of insults to the 
national honour by imperial commissioner Lin Zexu at Canton (Guangzhou). Thus, the very 
first war between China and any western power in world history began; though the Daoguang 
emperor seems to have had absolutely no idea that his empire was at war with the British 
until their naval forces appeared off the South China coast in June 1840. It was not until well 
into August that Palmerston’s letter containing the British government’s ultimatum and 
demands that the Chinese court finally realised to its surprise that a serious conflict was 
actually occurring. Until then, it seems, the emperor’s view was that Commissioner Lin’s 
bold and resolute actions had finally solved the vexed problem of the opium trade. 
It is from the date of the commencement of hostilities in June 1840 that the China 
today marks its traumatic, Century of National Humiliation, finally ending with the 
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foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949 and the retrieval of Chinese national 
sovereignty. The First Opium War, as it quickly became known and as historians have 
referred to it ever since, has remained a less urgent topic of conversation for British historians 
and literary critics. Far less traumatic for nineteenth-century British public than the debacle 
of the First Afghan War of 1839-42 and its disastrous but heroic retreat from Kabul, the 
China war was much less palatable to domestic tastes with its accounts of heavily 
asymmetrical military and naval encounter and tales of remorseless butchery, what became 
the first of two nineteenth-century opium wars had little to inflame the patriotic imagination 
yet much to trouble and perplex. It seldom features in our contemporary literary and cultural 
accounts of the period, and yet it was a war that involved several leading literary figures in 
the national public debate it occasioned about the war’s morality, justice, and even its very 
legality. At that meeting of the government in October at Windsor, perhaps one literary ghost 
still hung in the damp autumnal air while these men, connected as they were by the usual 
homosocial networks of nineteenth-century educational, social and public life, discussed 
exactly what should be done about the troublesome matter of China, and, more importantly, 
who was to pay the two or three millions of pounds that Sir Charles Elliot had inconveniently 
and unilaterally requisitioned from the British crown to compensate the private merchants for 
their Indian opium handed over to Commissioner Lin and subsequently destroyed.  
The wife of leading Whig statesman, William Lamb, 2nd Viscount Melbourne, 
Caroline Lamb had been involved in a notorious public affair with Byron in 1812, leading to 
her attempted suicide and the publication of her salacious and spiteful gothic roman à clef, 
Glenarvon in 1816. Though Caroline Lamb had died some ten years earlier, Melbourne 
remained much affected by her death. Hobhouse, was Byron’s close friend and best man at 
his wedding. Accompanying Byron on his tour of the Levant in 1811-12, he later provided 
the notes for the fourth canto of Childe Harold (1817) to whom the poem was dedicated. He 
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was Byron’s literary executor who, notoriously, oversaw the burning of his friend’s personal 
diary and the secrets it contained. Thomas Macaulay, only five years younger than Keats, 
made his name by writing a series of essays on literary subjects for the Edinburgh Review in 
the 1820s and 1830s especially those on Milton and Byron. In many ways, the Opium War 
was Macaulay’s war and his intervention in the Commons debate of March 1840 was crucial 
to the survival of the government. Although perhaps long since exorcised, the spectral 
memory of the personality Britain’s most celebrated poet of the literary orient, who died of 
fever at Missolonghi in the struggle for Greek independence, shared by these four men tempts 
us to reflect on the ways we might think of the First Opium War of 1839 [1840]-1842 as one 
of the last wars of the romantic period, or even, a romantic war itself. Not present at that 
cabinet meeting was another literary figure, a Tory and not a Whig, living an impoverished 
life some three hundred miles away in Edinburgh, yet someone who retained a very keen 
personal interest in opium and China, and who contributed most notably to the public debate 
on the origins of the war via the pages of Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, certainly one of 
the most powerful prose writers of the nineteenth century, Mr Thomas De Quincey, now 
known to all as the “opium-eater.” Absent also but closer to government was the romantic 
satirist, essayist and close friend of Percy Shelley, Thomas Love Peacock. Since 1836, 
Peacock had been the Chief Examiner of Indian Correspondence for the East India Company, 
succeeding James Mill. A keen enthusiast and evangelist for the new technology of steam 
navigation, in that year of 1839, Peacock convinced the secret committee of the Company to 
commission and construct six powerful, heavily-armed iron steamboats from the Glasgow 
shipbuilders Lairds. One of these new leviathans, the 660-ton Nemesis was sent across the 
world to China. Its terrifyingly destructive Congreve rockets devastated any Chinese shipping 
unfortunate enough to come within the range of its armaments and its shallow draught and 
steam power made it mobile and deadly (Marshall, 1-19). 
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The causes of the First Opium War with China are complex and the subject of much 
historical debate. Indeed, the naming of the war as either the “Opium War” or the “Chinese 
War” is itself much contested then and now. The phrase was coined at least as early as 
January 1840, though it was frequently attributed to Karl Marx who excoriated the hypocrisy 
and venality of merchants and the “Christianity-canting and civilization-mongering British 
Government” in a series of articles for the New York Daily Times on the two Opium Wars 
(Marx, “Opium Trade,” [September 25 (1858)], 191).  For Marx the “antiquated” empire of 
China “vegetating in the teeth of time” was “prompted by ethical motives” while “modern” 
society fights for the privilege of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets.” 
Marx accused the British of “openly preaching free trade in poison” while secretly defending 
the monopoly of its manufacture” in Bengal. The “corruption that ate into the heart of the 
Celestial bureaucracy […] was, together with the opium chests, smuggled into the empire 
from the English storeships anchored at Whampoa”  (Marx, “Opium Trade [September 20 
(1858)], 188), Very quickly, however, the designation of “Opium War” was challenged.  
Another contemporary pamphlet objected that, “[o]pium has nothing to do with it. It is not an 
opium war—it is a war to obtain redress for the grossest outrages that have ever been offered 
to English merchants” (Bell, cited in Chen, 133, 133-44). Famously, John Quincy Adams in 
1841 claimed that the cause of the Anglo-Chinese conflict was not opium, “a mere incident to 
the dispute,” but the imperial ceremony of the kowtow (ketou), “the arrogant and 
insupportable pretensions of China that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of 
mankind not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of 
the relations between lord and vassal” (cited in Gelber, Dragon, 188). Adams had been 
secretary of state at the time of the “Terranova Affair,” in which an American sailor had be 
given up to the Chinese and executed by strangling for an accidental homicide. Now chairing 
the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he arrived at the conclusion that opium was not 
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the casus belli, but the Chinese denial of the norms of international law and diplomacy. He 
claimed that opium was no more the cause of the war than the throwing overboard of the tea 
in Boston harbour was the cause of the American revolution (Chen, 240-41). Behind both 
events in Boston and Canton was East India Company tea and global networks of imperial 
trade.  
 
The Chinese crisis of 1839 touched off a heated debate both within the British community in 
China and within British public opinion. Various opinions were advanced as to the fairness or 
injustice of Lin’s conduct and the wisdom of the actions of Elliot. The ethics of the opium 
trade and its legality were strongly questioned. The pro-Tory and anti-government Times 
attacked Melbourne’s government, claiming that never before has “our trading interests and 
our honour as a great and civilised nation have been brought into question country have been 
brought into question as in this instance.”1 Among the many contributions to the debate, two 
of the most notable publications were the Rev. Algernon Sydney Thelwall’s The Iniquities of 
the Opium Trade (1839), also serialised in the Times, and Samuel Warren’s The Opium 
Question (1840), sponsored by the merchants Jardine and Matheson and expressing the pro-
trade views. 
 High Church evangelical and hammer of Catholicism, the reverend Thelwall was the 
eldest son of the radical 1790s lecturer and poet, John Thelwall. Named after the great 
seventeenth-century republican and commonwealthman, Algernon Sydney, he was educated 
at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1818 and ordained the following year. Thelwall became 
curate of Blackford, Somerset in 1829 and founded the Trinitarian Bible Society in 1831 
becoming its secretary from 1836 to 1847. His father, John, was, from the mid-1790s until 
around 1805, an intimate friend of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, then a fiery radical unitarian 
dissenter. So close were the two men that Coleridge had for a time cherished the hoped that 
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Thelwall and family would join his west country circle with the Wordsworths.2 Algernon 
Thelwall rejected his father’s radicalism and materialism as well as Coleridge’s Unitarianism. 
Born in 1795, it is not likely that he remembered much of his personal encounter with 
Coleridge, but it is quite possible that his father in later life regaled him with anecdotes and 
recollections of his famous friend. It is interesting to speculate whether Algernon’s staunch 
opposition to the opium trade with China may have been initiated by harrowing tales his 
father might have told him as a young man of Coleridge’s addiction to opium and the terrible 
consequences that the drug had on his later life. It does seem something of a coincidence that 
Algernon should espouse the anti-opium cause with such energy and success. As late as 
November 1803, Coleridge was writing to Thelwall requesting him to visit “the best Druggist 
in Kendal […] & purchase an Ounce of crude opium, & 9 ounces of Laudanum.”3 This 
followed on from a protracted, yet failed, attempt to abstain from the drug.  Algernon would 
then be only be eight years old but his visceral hostility to opium use was another example of 
his repudiation of his father’s free-thinking political views. 
Thelwall presents the reader with a substantial collection of writings and documents 
about opium and the trade, from the very hostile, missionary perspective. concluding: 
 
That opium, used as a stimulant or luxury, is a deleterious drug which ruins those who 
indulge in it, in mind, body, and estate—which depraves and enervates them, 
physically, intellectually, and morally, and finally brings them to an untimely grave: 
that it is introduced into China in such immense quantities, as to effect the ruin of 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of the inhabitants: that thousands of acres of 
the most rich and fertile land, which might supply abundance of wholesome food for 
the support of many thousands of our fellow creatures, in health and comfort, are 
worse than wasted in the production of this poison, of which the tendency and effect 
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is to ruin and destroy: that this baneful drug is smuggled into China by our 
countrymen in the East-Indies in direct and systematic violation and defiance of all 
laws both human and divine, and in a manner calculated to justify the Chinese 
government in excluding us from all the benefits of comfortable and unrestricted 
intercourse with their immense population and, finally that the baneful effects of 
opium smoking, and the whole system of iniquity by which so much opium is 
smuggled into the country, are perfectly laid open and familiarly known to the 
Chinese authorities both provincial and supreme  [.…] What, then, shall be said of 
you—what will you in your conscience judge concerning yourself—if you (now 
knowing the fact, that the opium trade is every year destroying thousands and tens of 
thousands of the people of China) shall go on unconcerned and reckless, without 
lifting up either your voice or your hand, to protest against or prevent such wholesale 
murder?4 
 
Thelwall’s thundering against the trade are fairly typical of anti-opium propaganda. His tract 
attained a wide audience in Britain and India and was even came to the attention of Lin 
himself, who was delighted to receive a confirmation of his severe prohibitionist policies 
from a British sympathizer.  
Thelwall’s Iniquities was swiftly answered by Samuel Warren’s The Opium Question 
(1840), commissioned by the pro-opium lobby. Warren’s tract was extremely influential and 
one of the first to frame the issue as a case. De Quincey’s later essay “The Opium and the 
China Question” of June 1840 was just one of a number of essays that responded to Warren’s 
publication. Warren set out a persuasive defence of the trade and the opium merchants, if not 
for the Melbourne government. Warren, like Algernon Thelwall, was a man with strong 
romantic connections. Trained in Edinburgh in the late 1820s as a medical student, he left 
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Edinburgh in 1828 to study law and qualify for the bar in London. As a practising physician 
of six years’ experience, Warren knew laudanum well. Although he never returned to 
Edinburgh he stayed closely connected to Blackwood’s. Though largely and unfairly 
neglected today, Warren was very much the literary gentleman, the author of numerous 
romantic novels and stories. These were first published in Blackwood’s Magazine, and often 
presented sensational medical case histories, frequently featuring the supernatural, insanity 
and sensational deathbeds.5 His most famous novel Ten Thousand a Year, a satire on the law, 
was serialised by Blackwood’s in 1839 thought to have influenced Dickens’ Bleak House 
(1852-53). Laudanum as a drug features prominently in his better-known novel, Affecting 
Schemes being Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician (1837) which is a collection of 
sensational case studies, one of which features laudanum prominently in the death scene of 
Eliza Herbert, a beautiful and delicate consumptive. Edgar Allan Poe was Warren’s admirer 
and Eliza bears some resemblance to his doomed, opium-soaked Madeline Usher. Warren 
was also referenced in Poe’s satirical story, “How to Write a Blackwood Article” (1838).  
Warren’s engaging biographical essay, “A Few Personal Recollections of Christopher 
North,” recounted how, while a medical student at Edinburgh, he was introduced by John 
Wilson to De Quincey in 1828, who was then staying with North. Warren describes De 
Quincey as “a little slight man, dressed in black, pale, care worn, and with a very high 
forehead […] exceedingly languid.” While sitting opposite to De Quincey, Warren recounts 
how Wilson knowingly alerted him to the fact “it will be a queer kind of wine that you will 
see him drinking.” After a few glasses of what is clearly laudanum, De Quincey became 
suddenly loquacious and thoughtful in his conversation: 
 
It was on some metaphysical subject; and at length I well recollect that the discussion 
turned to the nature of Forgetfulness. “Is such a thing as forgetting possible to the human 
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mind?” asked Mr De Quincey—“Does the mind ever actually lose anything for ever? Is 
not every impression it has once received, reproducible? How often a thing is suddenly 
recollected that had happened many, many years before, but never been thought of till 
that moment! –Possibly a suddenly developed power of recollecting every act of a man’s 
life may constitute the Great Book to be opened before him in the judgment day.”6 
 
Warren records that, entranced by De Quincey’s conversation, he “went almost supperless to 
bed.” De Quincey had already published similar speculations about the processes of 
“forgetting” in the second part his Confessions published in October 1821 in the London 
Magazine and would notably return to them in his influential formulation of the notion of the 
“palimpsest” in Suspiria de Profundis (1845). What fugitive influences may have derived 
from Warren’s observations of De Quincey and his peculiar wine might have had on 
Warren’s tract and his fiction more widely is pure speculation. When composing his own 
Opium War essay, did De Quincey ever recover from the palimpsest of his own subconscious 
mind, his evening with that entranced young medical student who hung upon his every word? 
De Quincey and the younger Warren it seems were never, as far we know, to meet again, Yet 
the connections forged by the great opium network globally and nationally also included 
these more intimate and fugitive patterns of connection and influence between Coleridge, 
Thelwall (père et fils), De Quincey and Warren. 
Warren’s The Opium Question argues that the British government is honour-bound to 
compensate the merchants the cost of surrendering of the opium to Commissioner Lin. He 
believes that the Qing government has shown itself to be entirely capricious having allowed 
the trade to develop and that its objections are pragmatic not ethical, concerned with the drain 
of silver from the country and protecting its domestic opium production. He argues that the 
revenue from the trade is crucial to the economy of British India and that the Chinese were 
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about to legalise the trade. Warren claims argues that the imprisonment of the merchants and 
the seizure of their opium was illegal under international law. He jeers about how “the 
bloated vain-glory and grandiloquence of the Chinese would probably collapse at the very 
first prick of a British bayonet; their flimsy armaments fly like chaff before the wind at the 
sight of one single British man of war—portentous object making its appearance before her 
coasts, cleared for action. It is not impossible that the roar of her first gun would fill all Pekin 
with tottering knees and pallid faces.”7 In his extended discussion of the qualities and effects 
of opium, Warren invokes the presence of De Quincey, whom he witnessed quaffing 
laudanum like wine at Wilson’s soiree some ten or so years ago: 
 
As to the fatally-fascinating qualities of this drug, a vast deal has been said, that is, it 
is suspected, based upon a gross exaggeration; and it may not be impossible to detect 
one subtle, and perhaps, unsuspected source of prejudice against everyone concerned 
in the supply of it. Ever since the year (1820) [sic] when Mr. De Quincey published 
his remarkable “Confessions of an English Opium Eater,”—a work which produced a 
thrilling sensation  over all the country, owing to the extraordinary nature of its 
details—to the wild, dazzling, but often dismal splendour of his dreams; his unearthly 
ecstasies; the fearful mental re-action and physical agonies which he endured; all of 
which were described in a style enriched with evident fruits of universal 
scholarship—in a strain too, of very great power and pathos—OPIUM has been 
invested with a mysterious kind of interest and awe, producing an impression long 
retained by minds suffused with recollection of that extraordinary performance (pp. 
83-84). 
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Warren pays tribute to the great imaginative and literary power of De Quincey’s Confessions, 
but he suggests that De Quincey has been a tad disingenuous in mystifying opium and 
transforming a substance that was commonly taken for the relief of pain and stomach 
problems into something more dangerous and alluring. De Quincey has so inflected 
contemporary understandings of opium that “almost any thing evil will now be received 
against” this “potent and deadly drug.”  In the context of China this has had some unintended 
and negative consequences: 
 
[P]ersons of excitable fancy are presented with frightful pictures of —as it were—two 
millions of De Quinceys created in China, by the opium merchants, and represented in 
all stages of suffering, and frequency of death, infinitely transcending all that has been 
described by that accurate and minute observer, and faithful narrator of his own 
sensations and sufferings; (and who, moreover, took opium to an extent—namely, 
eight thousand drops of laudanum a-day, equal to three hundred and twenty grains of 
opium, utterly beyond the reach of any but the richer Chinese); the very mention of 
those who are accessary to so fearful an infliction of alleged suffering, excites 
feelings of indignation and aversion [….] The observation […] as to the extent to 
which Mr. De Quincey took opium, leads one to hope and believe, that we have 
received very greatly exaggerated accounts as to the effects of opium upon the 
Chinese, in resect both of extant and intensity. The twenty or thirty thousand chests of 
opium which we distribute among three hundred and 70 millions of Chinese, surely 
produce scarcely a greater amount of physical suffering, and of immorality, than the 
ardent spirits sold openly and without complaint in all parts of our own virtuous and 
happy country (pp. 83-85). 
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Warren makes the familiar argument that the use of opium is no more harmful than that of 
spirits at home (a favourite notion of De Quincey’s) and he accuses his readership of re-
inscribing into the opium trade debate, De Quincey’s lurid Confessions. In so doing, he 
artfully plays with De Quincey’s famous trope of the East as the officina gentium, or the 
place where humanity was formed: “It contributes much to these feelings, that southern Asia 
is, and has been for thousands of years, the part of the earth most swarming with human life: 
the great officina gentium.” De Quincey famously continues, “[i]n China, over and above 
what it has in common with the rest of southern Asia, I am terrified by the modes of life, by 
manners, and the barrier of utter abhorrence, and want of sympathy, paced between us by 
feelings deeper than I can analyze.”8 Warren, a man of much literary ability, thus 
mischievously reverses De Quincey’s master trope here, imagining instead the opium 
merchants replicating two million Chinese iterations of De Quincey. This would be more 
than the entire population of London in 1841 which numbered some 1.8 million people in the 
most recent census.  
De Quincey had a well-known horror of self-replication and the loss of personal 
identity and freedom, linked ineluctably with his enslavement to opium, a terrible negation of 
the manly free will and agency espoused by official nineteenth-century British thinking. This 
fear is deployed in the famous depiction of Giovanni Battista Piranesi’s prints, Carceri 
d’invenzione (Imaginary Prisons) (c.1749-50). De Quincey describes the multiplied figure of 
Piranesi, 
 
Creeping along the sides of the walls you perceived a staircase; and upon it, groping his 
way upwards, was Piranesi himself: follow the stairs a little further and you perceive it 
come to a sudden and abrupt termination without any balustrade, and allowing no step 
onwards to him who had reached the extremity except into the depths below.  Whatever 
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is to become of poor Piranesi, you suppose at least that his labours must in some way 
terminate here.  But raise your eyes, and behold a second flight of stairs still higher, on 
which again Piranesi is perceived, but this time standing on the very brink of the 
abyss.  Again elevate your eye, and a still more aërial flight of stairs is beheld, and 
again is poor Piranesi busy on his aspiring labours; and so on, until the unfinished stairs 
and Piranesi both are lost in the upper gloom of the hall (78-79).  
 
Like Piranesi, De Quincey find that his self, consciousness and very identity is now taken 
from him and transformed into millions of opium smokers in a faraway and alien land, China, 
defined, like the opium eater himself, only by their dreadful addiction to the drug. Of course, 
Warren’s underlying satirical point is that there is and could be only one Mr De Quincey, 
whom he knew personally. This powerful image of image, however, becomes a key point in 
the public debate about the opium trade and the China question. 
 Warren’s work was answered by very many others. It is fair to say that this debate 
was conducted within the parameters of international law and economics, with China’s 
defenders arguing that the empire had a perfect right to manage trade as it wished and to 
forbid the trade in opium if it decided. Defenders of the trade and the subsequent conflict 
seldom disputed this key point but argued that China had unilaterally and precipitately 
terminated a long-established trade, only nominally illegal, and visited violence and illegality 
on peaceful British subjects, thus insulting Britain’s national honour. China’s defenders 
sought to emphasize the pernicious and poisonous aspects of opium, while those opposed 
either denied the trade was a factor in their calculations, or that opium was any more harmful 
than alcohol. De Quincey frequently featured in the public debate. Captain T. H. Bullock in 
his The Chinese Vindicated or Another View of the Opium Question, for example, poured 
scorn on Warren’s arguments: 
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He declares that the pernicious qualities of the drug are not so bad, that the opinion is 
founded upon a gross exaggeration, and that our prejudice on this point is owing to 
Mr. De Quincey’s remarkable “Confessions of an Opium Eater.” It is natural that the 
author “of the Diary of a late physician,” the verisimilitude of whose beautiful fictions 
so entirely duped event the members of the “Faculty,” that they really believed them 
to be the work of a brother of the craft: should suspect that the Opium Eater, was a 
work of imagination but there is unfortunately a mass of evidence, derived from 
several countries, all confirming the destructive effects of this pernicious drug. Mr. 
Thelwall quotes from several scientific, and other authentic works in France, Turkey, 
China, and elsewhere proof, more than sufficient, to convince the most incredulous, 
that the fascinating qualities of opium are nearly irresistible; and the details of the 
horrible effects upon a confirmed smoker, are absolutely revolting.9 
 
Bullock vindicated China’s right to order their trade as it wished and reminded his readership 
that smuggling was severely punished by transportation in Britain. He finds Lin’s actions to 
be reasonable and even restrained in the circumstances. He defends De Quincey from 
Warren’s implication that the Confessions may have been overly sensationalised. De 
Quincey, his opium use and his literary character thus appears as a contested issue in the 
public debate about the opium trade and war itself. That the status of what is now a canonical 
literary text, should feature so prominently in a national debate about Britain’s new war with 
China allows one to think of the war as very much a romantic conflict. 
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III 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, the newly appointed secretary for war (1839-41) and Whig MP 
for Edinburgh spoke powerfully in the Commons debate of April 1840 on the government’s 
China policy. Historian, scholar, poet and essayist, the liberal statesman was in many ways 
another of those figures viewed by Thomas De Quincey as one of his literary doubles. De 
Quincey’s hostility to Macaulay may well have begun in the latter’s childhood. De Quincey’s 
mother could not resist praising the ten-year old prodigy she encountered at one of Hannah 
More’s Bristol soirees when she wring to son in June 1811 that the “little Macaulay is a 
clever Boy, and puts me in mind of the elder Coleridge, but he says such extraordinary things 
that he will be ruined by praise […] he travels post, and amuses me inexpressibly with his 
motions and emotions” (De Quincey, Memorials, 2: 94). In 1827, De Quincey had penned a 
particularly vicious review in the Edinburgh Saturday Post of a Macaulay essay on George 
Canning’s liberal Tory administration in 1827. Macaulay’s essay attacked those Tories 
refusing to serve under the new prime minister, including Sir Robert Peel and De Quincey’s 
idol, the Duke of Wellington. De Quincey depicts the young Macaulay as the precocious 
champion of the Whigs, a gorgeously arrayed knight avidly challenging his adversaries to 
break a lance with him if they dare. He accuses Macaulay of participating in a “vulgar system 
of political pugilism” but nevertheless steps forward himself as a worthy Tory opponent (De 
Quincey “Review,” [July (1827)], 27-40). Although De Quincey’s riposte may have gone 
unnoticed by Macaulay, it remained in De Quincey’s consciousness. These connections and 
comparisons between the two men persisted. Macaulay, towards the end of his life and on the 
eve of the Second Opium War with China, was discomfited to find himself accused in the 
American press of resembling the elder De Quincey, a superannuated opium-eater who 
destroyed his faculties by using the drug. Macaulay vehemently denied this calumny claiming 
that “all the opium that I have swallowed in a life of fifty-three years does not amount to ten 
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grains,” adding he never “took a drop of laudanum, except in obedience to medical authority” 
admitting only to having taken some in the year 1849 during the cholera epidemic (Macaulay, 
Journals, 99). Thus, De Quincey already identified the successful young Whig rising star as 
an object of serious envy before his writing on the Opium War of 1840. No doubt his 
criticisms of Melbourne’s government were coloured by his long-standing jealousy of the 
much more successful politician and man of letters. Though eclipsed by De Quincey in the 
eye of modern critics of romantic period writing, Macaulay had made his name with powerful 
literary essay for the Edinburgh Review on “Milton” (1825) and “Byron” (1831) and many 
other subjects. He established himself as a master of English prose and an outstanding 
classicist. In many ways, Macaulay had become the voice of the new reforming Whig and 
educated middle classes of the 1830s which had displaced the Tories and inaugurated a 
wholesale decade of reform, beginning with the electoral system in 1832. His outstanding 
rhetorical skills, enormous classical erudition and devastating wit established him as a leader 
of the reforming movement and the new laissez faire brand of economics and trade. No 
wonder De Quincey detested him. Macaulay was already by 1840, rich, successful, powerful 
and lionised, a parvenu politician whose new understandings of global modernity had 
influenced government and society in both Britain and the Indian subcontinent, and whose 
liberal imperialism chimed well with the march of the mid-nineteenth-century progressive 
mind. His role in anglicizing Indian government and intellectual life is well-known and still 
hotly debated, and his legacy remains potent and contested. He had been heavily involved 
with the drafting of the Charter Act of 1833, which had finally removed the East India 
Company’s monopoly of the tea trade with China and centralized the British government of 
India. The act gave British India its own legislature, the Governor-General-in-Council, and 
provided a new Law Commission to reform and codify Indian law. Unlike De Quincey, 
Macaulay really had visited the “East,” not just dreamt about it, working in India for six 
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years, reforming Indian education and government along Bentham-ite utilitarian lines, under 
the administration of Lord William Bentinck, notably making the English language the 
linguistic medium of government and made himself a very wealthy man in the process. In his 
brief tenure as secretary of war, he would manage to initiate three important wars in China, 
Egypt and Afghanistan. 
Macaulay understood something of the poisonous effects of opium and the political 
implications of is use. In his major speech on the “Government of India” of 10th July 1833 to 
the House of Commons, he argued for the modernization and liberalization of the Indian 
government. It was important, he argued, that the benefits of European civilization were also 
given to the people of India even at the risk of Britain’s Indian subjects outgrowing their need 
for British guidance. To make his point he used an unusual but very potent analogy: 
 
It was, as [François] Bernier tells us, the practice of the miserable tyrants whom he 
found in India, when they dreaded the capacity and spirit of some distinguished subject, 
and yet could not venture to murder him, to administer to him a daily dose of the 
pousta, a preparation of opium, the effect of which was in a few months to destroy all 
the bodily and mental powers of the wretch who was drugged with it, and to turn him 
into a helpless idiot. The detestable artifice, more horrible than assassination itself, was 
worthy of those who employed it. It is no model for the English nation. We shall never 
consent to administer the pousta to a whole community, to stupefy and paralyse a great 
people whom God has committed to our charge, for the wretched purpose of rendering 
them more amenable to our control [….] We are free, we are civilised, to little purpose, 
if we grudge to any portion of the human race an equal measure of freedom and 
civilisation (Macaulay, “Government of India,” 717). 
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Metaphorically, poisoning a nation with opium to render it helpless and pliable, making a 
subject people malleable through a form of ideological drug dependency and thus a fit and 
easy subject for colonialism, was “no model for the English nation,” according to Macaulay; 
yet six years later, this was exactly what Macaulay’s liberal government was accused of 
literally doing to China via the opium trade. One should also not forget, as the novelist 
Amitav Ghosh has recently reminded us in his engaging Ibis trilogy of novels that countless 
Indian opium addicts were indeed created by the British monopoly of Indian opium 
production.10 Charles Alexander Bruce who pioneered the East India Company’s tea 
plantations in Assam, and therefore nineteenth-century British tea commerce, was quite 
desperate to prevent the production of opium from spreading to there and degrading its 
people. Bruce expostulated that the people should be harvesting the newly-found, wholesome 
Indian tea plant variety, Camelia assamica and not forced into growing the pernicious 
Papavaer somniferum, the white opium poppy. He feared that the new province would 
become “infected” with the “opium mania,” that “dreadful plague that has depopulated this 
beautiful country.” For Bruce the “vile drug” has physically deformed the population, “the 
women have fewer children compared with those of other countries, and the children seldom 
live to be old men” (cited in Fry, 32-33). Another critic of 1840 angrily denounced the British 
for “demoralizing their own subjects in India; ONE-HALF OF THE CRIME IN THE 
OPIUM DISTRICTS, MURDERS, RAPES, AND AFFRAYS, HAVE THEIR ORIGIN IN 
OPIUM-EATING” (cited in Fry, 37-38). It could be argued that the British were already 
accomplishing in India what Bernier had accused the “miserable tyrants” of the Moghuls of 
trying to achieve with their poisonous “pousta.” Macaulay can hardly not have been familiar 
with the business and effects of the British opium monopoly during his extensive service in 
India. His opium metaphor of the “pousta” rhetorically undermines his reasoning on several 
levels. Macaulay had also written in his celebrated biographical essay on Robert Clive of 
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January 1840 concerning Clive’s late opium addiction and death. In order to obtain ease from 
severe pain Clive “called in the help of opium; and he was gradually enslaved by this 
treacherous ally” and “after sitting silent and torpid for hours, [he would] rouse himself to the 
discussion of some great question, would display in full vigour all the talents of the soldier 
and the statesman, and would then sink back into his melancholy repose” (Macaulay “Lord 
Clive”, 371). Ironically, Clive who put down a revolt against the British and did so much to 
secure the opium monopoly for the British in India, picked up the opium habit and became 
“enslaved” by the drug like countless Indians and Chinese and, much nearer home, De 
Quincey. 
 In his powerful speech on the “War with China” of 7th April 1840, Macaulay returns 
ineluctably to the issues of this “treacherous ally” opium and the colonial politics associated 
with it, recounting how one of the Chinese imperial advisers during the emperor’s debate 
about whether to legalize or prohibit the opium trade of 1836 had argued that “opium is the 
weapon by which England effects her conquests,” persuading “the people of Hindostan to 
smoke and swallow this besotting drug, till they became so feeble in body and mind, that they 
were subjugated without difficulty” (Macaulay, “War with China”, 218). While this might 
not apply to India, the relevance to China was more pronounced. Macaulay’s official position 
on opium as a contraband trade was simply to distance the British from it. He argued that if 
the British state was famously unable to prevent the smuggling of tobacco and brandy at 
home, then putting a stop to the opium traffic in China was impossible: 
 
Remember what powerful motives both the buyer and the seller would have been 
impelled to deal with each other. The buyer would have been driven to the seller by 
something little short of torture, by a physical craving as fierce and impatient as any 
to which our race us subject. For when stimulants of this sort have been long used, 
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they are desired with a rage which resembles the rage of hunger […] and do you 
imagine that the intense appetite, on the one side for what had become a necessary of 
life, and on the other for riches, would have been appeased by a few lines signed by 
Charles Elliott?’ (220-221)  
 
Macaulay appears here to accept the argument that opium is both a highly addictive and very 
poisonous drug which is damaging the Chinese state. The user here is subject to “fierce and 
impatient” cravings and tortures. The British would thus not be able to put down this 
contraband trade even if they wanted. In any case, they had been under the strong impression 
that legalization of the trade by the Chinese was possible by 1837. Macaulay, paradoxically, 
also stresses the drug, rightly used, is “one of the most precious boons vouchsafed by 
Providence to man, Powerful to assuage pain, to sooth irritation, and to restore health” (223),  
 Macaulay seeks to separate the opium issue from that of the war. He argues that 
Commissioner Lin’s intimidation of the British marks the key moment of breakdown 
between the two nations, not the expansion of opium trade prior to the war. He uses the word 
“rupture” ten times in his speech to emphasize this point. He denies that his government is 
“making war for the purpose of forcing the Government of China to admit opium” which 
would be an unambiguous atrocity.  Instead, he focuses on the issue of British national 
honour. This is a case where “the liberties and lives of Englishmen are at stake” (Macaulay, 
“War with China”, 226). It is not for the British to instruct China what it may or may not do 
about international trade. According to the law of nations, the emperor has 
 
[A] perfect right to keep out opium and to keep silver in, if he could do so by means 
consistent with morality and public law [….] But, when finding that they could not 
suppress the contraband trade by just means, they resorted to means flagrantly unjust, 
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when they imprisoned our innocent countrymen, when they insulted our Sovereign in 
the person of her representative, then it became our duty to demand satisfaction. 
Whether the opium trade be a pernicious trade is not the question (224). 
 
Macaulay falls back on a spurious analogy with the British suppression of the slave trade in 
the 1830s, never mentioning throughout his speech that the opium smuggled into China was 
actually produced by a British Indian government monopoly and specifically cultured for 
smoking within the Chinese market, a fact of which his six-year residence in Calcutta surely 
would have made him aware. He falls back on the argument that Lin in confiscating British 
property and in detaining British merchants, both the innocent and the guilty, was acting “in a 
manner inconsistent with the law of nations.”  
 
The Imperial Commissioner, emboldened by the facility with which he had perpetrated 
the first outrage, and utterly ignorant of the relative position of his country and ours in 
the scale of power and civilisation, has risen in his requisitions. He began by 
confiscating property. His next demand was for innocent blood. A Chinese had been 
slain. Careful inquiry was made; but it was impossible to ascertain who was the slayer, 
or even to what nation the slayer belonged. No matter. It was notified to the 
Superintendent that some subject of the Queen, innocent or guilty, must be delivered 
up to suffer death. The Superintendent refused to comply. Then our countrymen at 
Canton were seized. Those who were at Macao were driven thence: not men alone, but 
women with child, babies at the breast. The fugitives begged in vain for a morsel of 
bread. Our Lascars, people of a different colour from ours, but still our fellow-subjects, 
were flung into the sea. An English gentleman was barbarously mutilated. And was 
this to be borne? (226).  
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Macaulay skilfully exploits Lin’s actions to picture him as acting completely outside of 
international law, desirous of spilling ‘innocent blood’ and of ruthlessly terrorising British 
women and children. Alluding to the notable “Lin Weixi incident” in which a Chinese local 
had been killed during an affray with other Chinese and British sailors, Macaulay exploits the 
long-running issue of the incompatibility between Chinese and British understandings of 
“accidental homicide” that had dogged Sino-British relations since the infamous Lady 
Hughes incident of 1785. Macaulay also refers back to the “kowtow” (ketou) controversy 
dismissing it as a matter of mere etiquette in the larger, more serious context.11 
 
When our ambassadors were required to perform a prostration, which in Europe 
would have been considered as degrading, we were rather amused than irritated. It 
would have been unworthy of us to have recourse to arms on account of an uncivil 
phrase, or of a dispute about a ceremony. But this is not a question of phrases and 
ceremonies. The liberties and lives of Englishmen are at stake: and it is fit that all 
nations, civilised and uncivilised, should know that, wherever the Englishman may 
wander, he is followed by the eye and guarded by the power of England (226). 
 
Macaulay’s speech finishes with one of his grand Cromwellian perorations about how British 
citizens are protected around the globe by a nation that “has not so degenerated since the 
Great Protector vowed he would make the name of Englishman as much respected as ever 
had been the name of Roman citizen,” invoking the horrors of white slavery and the 
notorious “Black Hole of Calcutta” (227). Macaulay’s jingoism and xenophobia succeeded. 
Melbourne’s fragile ministry won the division by a majority of just nine votes (271 to 262), 
eventually losing office in August 1841, by which time Macaulay could congratulate himself 
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on what then looked like three very successful wars across the east. He left office in high 
optimism convinced that his government had “placed England at the head of the world”, 
having dictated peace “at once in the heart of Bactria, at the mouth of the Nile and in the 
Yellow Sea” (cited in Masani, 168). 
 
III 
Thomas De Quincey certainly knew of Macaulay’s apologia for the forthcoming war with 
China when he wrote his “The Opium and the China Question” in June of 1840. As a Tory, 
he despised the Melbourne government and, as we have seen, was highly resentful of its 
powerful propagandist and secretary of war. The topic of opium was a feature in both the 
writings and lives of the two men. But then again, De Quincey was terrified by all things 
Asiatic and had a visceral and almost pathological hatred of the Chinese. As we shall see, he 
also may have had a personal and interested hope than his family might prosper from the 
coming conflict and that the war might make the family fortune and thus pay for his 
ruinously expensive opium habit. All these factors, personal, professional and political 
informed his writing about opium and China. 
De Quincey actually penned four essays on China over the period 1840-1857, a brace 
each on the circumstances relating to the two opium wars of 1839-42 and 1856-60. It is 
important that scholars of De Quincey and his response to China should pay close attention to 
the very different historical moments that produced the two sets of texts, composed twenty 
years apart, and not simply to conflate them within a seamless continuum demonstrating an 
essentialized “romantic” or representative nineteenth-century British understanding of China. 
The first two pieces (and one is a brief postscript) were published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine, a major nineteenth-century journal with a singular, highly self-referential and 
frequently perverse view of the world and a subscription of around nine thousand in the 
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1830s, though with a cultural influence much beyond what those numbers suggest. The 
second were published in The Titan, A Monthly Magazine, a short-lived (1856-59) and much 
less influential magazine, and then re-published in an enhanced pamphlet form with a preface 
and additions (Palmigiano, 591-96). John Barrell, among others, has convincingly 
demonstrated that De Quincey’s hostility to Asia was overdetermined by his peculiar 
psychological and class identity in which underlying fears and anxieties about the working 
classes, revolution and specific personal family issues were displaced, via his celebrated 
opium dreams, onto the “East,” so one must always make allowances both for De Quincey’s 
idiosyncrasies and the extraordinary personal biographical and publishing circumstances 
which he faced as well as the specific literary politics of the journals he published within 
(Barrell, 1-30, 155). 
Similarly, once must make allowance for the different historical moments of the two 
opium wars in literary and cultural history and history more generally. Although the 
possibility of getting out of the opium trade was discussed as a serious prospect by the British 
and Indian governments in 1840, by the 1850s the government in India was far too dependent 
revenue from the trade to even countenance the possibility of disinvestment (Wong, 333-
456). The rise of what we know of as “jingoism” was certainly more pronounced in 1856 
when the ageing Palmerston won a landslide election victory over decision to go to war with 
China for a second time. This certainly would not have been the case in 1840 had 
Melbourne’s government lost the debate on its handling of this unpopular war. Although the 
First Opium War is a highly significant and important historical event it is seldom, if at all, 
discussed by romantic period scholars and when it is, it is as a kind of side-show in the larger 
development of nineteenth-century British orientalism (especially India and the Levant), or 
with reference to, arguably, the period’s most powerful writer of prose, De Quincey. In such 
cases, it is frequently brought up as a supplementary discussion of his earlier Confessions of 
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an English Opium Eater (1821), most notably those sections dealing with his opium 
nightmares and what has, in many ways, become the epitome of the romantic east-west 
encounter, the visit of the uncanny Malay to Wordsworth’s Dove cottage, which De 
Quincey’s then rented. There are a substantial number of critical discussions of this 
encounter, for example, most recently, David Simpson’s Romanticism and the Question of 
the Stranger (2013) and Eugenia Jenkins have powerfully interrogated the scene for its 
deployment of binaries of domestic and exotic, especially featuring those extraordinarily 
ambiguous and resonant commodity doppelgangers, opium and tea (Simpson, 54-81; Jenkins, 
105-31). Additionally, we have new works on tea and empire by Markman Ellis and Erika 
Rappaport as well as new cultural histories of opium by Thomas Dormandy and Lucy Inglis. 
On the side of the discipline of historical enquiry numerous recent discussions of the opium 
trade and the opium war have been published. In particular, Julia Lovell’s revisionist history. 
The Opium War appeared in 2011 and an English language translation of Mao Haijian’s 
enormously detailed The Qing Empire and the Opium War appeared in 2017. A new 
biography of the most famous (or notorious) opium merchants, William Jardine and James 
Matheson by Richard Grace also appeared in 2014. 
In such historical writings, which take into the British public debate about the First 
Opium War, Thomas De Quincey’s voice is seldom heard. Lovell has only one reference to 
him and it is parenthetical: “[t]he clichéd image of opium-smoking is of prostration and 
narcolepsy; to many (including Thomas De Quincey who walked the London Streets by night 
sustained by laudanum), it was a stimulant. Chinese coolie masses would refresh their 
capacity for backbreaking labour with midday opium breaks” (Lovell, 19). An earlier study 
by Harry Gelber also has just one reference to De Quincey: “[n]o-one thought that Thomas 
De Quincey’s famous “Confessions of an English Opium Eater’ published in 1821, was 
evidence of anything remotely criminal” (Gelber, Opium Soldiers and Evangelicals, 88). 
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Older histories are similarly reticent. In his The Chinese Opium Wars (1975), Jack Beeching 
cites De Quincey’s Confessions as a headnote to his chapter on the prelude to the war but 
nothing else. Peter Ward Fay’s The Opium War (1975), writes quite inaccurately that De 
Quincey, “living sick and solitary in Edinburgh—and making spasmodic efforts to cut his 
daily dose of laudanum from eight thousand drops to two or three hundred—did not so as far 
we know give China’s numberless addicts a thought” (Fay, 204).  This pattern was repeated 
in all the histories I checked. Only one study took De Quincey’s Blackwood’s essay of June 
1840 on the war as a serious expression of a wider public opinion, but the author appears 
unaware that the essay was authored by De Quincey (Chen, 321, 324). 
The war turned bitter for De Quincey, though he could not know this when he penned 
his essay. One of his sons, Horatio (or Horace) died in the conflict, aged only twenty-two 
years. De Quincey and Horace’s grandmother had raised the £900 required to purchase a 
commission as an ensign for Horace who joined the 26th Regiment of Foot, a 
Scottish infantry regiment of the British Army in 1840. The 26th Foot (or “The 
Cameronians”) as it was known was stationed at Calcutta and the regiment embarked at 
Calcutta on 24 March 1840 with a strength of nine hundred men, bound for Singapore, where 
it rendezvoused with the rest of the expeditionary force being prepared for service in 
China. Horace left Scotland in October of 1841 arriving in Hong Kong, presumably via 
London and Calcutta, where he was to die just two months later. In August of the following 
year, De Quincey was formally notified, by the War Office, of his death from a malarial fever 
at Hong Kong. We cannot know for certain why Horace enlisted in the 26th Foot but if he did 
so, at this time, then he would be certain that the China war would be his eventual 
destination. His father is reported to have claimed he “advised him against going to China” 
(Morrison, 314, 322, 326-7).  The key motive must have been financial with the possibility of 
substantial prize money or loot to be gained. China was a most lucrative posting and many 
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young soldiers made their fortunes from service there. Could it be that Thomas projected that 
Horace’s involvement in China might actually save the De Quincey family from its perilous 
financial position made worse by the cost of De Quincey’s addiction to the very drug that the 
war was being fought over? This might explain why De Quincey and his mother were willing 
and able to raise the substantial sum of £900 for his commission. The period 1840-42 was 
certainly a low ebb in De Quincey’s family history, by 1842 De Quincey had lost four of his 
children and was emotionally exhausted.  
De Quincey might have had additional more recent motives confirming his long-
standing animus against the Chinese. In his later essay on China and the second opium war, 
published in the Titan in 1857, he accused the Chinese of a number of atrocities, including 
treacherously poisoning the wells used by the British for water. He writes that some eight 
hundred men died in the 26th Cameronian regiment on Hong Kong, “but the disease was 
mysterious; for the stationary inhabitants of Hong-Kong did not die.” De Quincey here 
hazards a “reasonable conjecture that the men had swallowed a slow poison” (De Quincey, 
China, 103). Among those who died in Hong Kong at this time was Horace, and it seems 
probable that father had come to harbour a strong suspicion that Horace met his end through 
poisoning by the local Chinese rather than fever. If so, the issue of drugs and opium, cure and 
poison is once more present, as the Chinese poison De Quincey’s son, while De Quincey’s 
nation poisons the Chinese empire with its opium. De Quincey’s suspicion is unlikely to have 
been correct. A soldier presents at the time, Lieutenant John Ouchterlony recounted how the 
deaths of the new the recruits from England arriving in Hong Kong was due to their “profuse 
indulgence in the use of samshoo, aided by exposure to the sun’s mid-day rays and by the 
immoderate use of sea bathing” (Ouchterlony 215-16). In any case sanitary conditions among 
the British troops were appalling and most of the deaths among then were due to outbreaks of 
cholera rather than the Chinese. Yet if De Quincey had been correct in his surmise, the 
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Chinese poisoners would have not only murdered his son but deprived him of the opportunity 
to do his military duty and even to die a heroic and noble death. Blaming the Chinese for his 
son’s death may also have deflected some personal guilt De Quincey may have had over the 
odd affair of his son’s enlistment for China. One serious consequence of Horace’s death from 
fever was that it precluded him from obtaining any share in the highly lucrative prize money 
awarded to troops at the end of the conflict. The cost to the embattled De Quincey family of 
Horace’s death was both personally and economically severe. 
So, what does all this mean for De Quincey’s essay, “The Opium and China 
Question”? What status does it have as historical cultural or imaginative creative document? 
Charles J. Repka has, for instance, argued that “the opium eater came to promote the 
identification of ‘real’ literature with ‘power’ during the period of England’s greatest military 
triumphs and most vigorous colonial exploits, especially those connected with China” 
(Rzepka, 37-45). It is certainly clear that De Quincey’s response to the First Opium War is 
much more aesthetically and rhetorically sophisticated than any other of the many public 
statements.  The essay, however, is not obviously self-referential (as many of De Quincey’s 
writings are) in that the “opium eater” himself makes no dramatized appearance. The issue of 
opium abuse and addiction is quickly dealt with. De Quincey denies that opium addiction is 
problematic for any nation. He admits that opium is a special case of drug use due to “a 
specific effect known to follow the habitual use of opium, by which it induces a deadly torpor 
and disrelish of all exertion, and in most cases long before the health is deranged, and even in 
those constitutions which are by nature so congenially predisposed to this narcotic as never to 
be much shaken by its uttermost abuse.” (De Quincey, “Opium and China Question,” 535). 
Nevertheless, it is a luxury and therefore, far too expensive for the labouring classes: “[u]sing 
much opium how can the poor labourer support the expense--using little, how can he suffer in 
his energies or his animal spirits?” (536). Abuse requires a continually increasing dose and 
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the resource to fund it, as the impoverished writer well knew. De Quincey claims that the 
Chinese have no interest in the health of the nation, but simply wish to stem the export of 
their silver, used in payment for the opium, as well as to protect their nascent domestic opium 
production by excluding the better-quality Indian product, ideal for smoking. It was East 
India Company policy to manufacture its opium with a view to Chinese consumption patterns 
maintaining the “the purity and strength” of the drug “when dried and smoked through a 
pipe” (Fry, 20). By the 1830s, Chinese domestic opium production was certainly substantial 
and significant, though of inferior quality and the Qing government made strenuous, though 
unsuccessful, attempts to eradicate it. De Quincey was also wrong to deny that the use of 
opium was a luxury.  From the 1820s onward, its use in China spread inwards from the 
southeast China coast and downwards across class barriers at an alarming rate and there was 
plenty of evidence available to this effect (Zheng, 41-115). The Qing were especially and 
genuinely concerned about its habitual use by their troops who were becoming incapable 
because of its use. Nevertheless, for De Quincey, the use of the drug among the higher 
classes is simply one of “their habits of domestic indulgence” and the use among the lower, 
an economic impossibility (537).  
 De Quincey is clear at the outset that his views “tend to the policy of war—war 
conducted with exemplary vigour” (533), though he is embarrassed that this policy is 
currently at odds with the stated position of the Tory opposition to the Whig government of 
Melbourne, Palmerston and Macaulay. He argues for the justice of the war but also the 
“criminal want of foresight and provision in our own cabinet” (537). De Quincey is scathing 
about the Whig government. It gave Charles Elliot ambiguous orders and then disavowed his 
actions, not on any grounds of principle but simply with regard to expediency: there were not 
enough funds in the exchequer to make good Elliot’s pledge to the merchants. Therefore 
government intends to go to war to make the Chinese pay for the confiscated opium: “‘What 
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do you want?’ they say at the Treasury,--'Is it money? Well, we have none; but we can take a 
purse for you on the Queen’s highway, and that we will soon do’.” (541). 
Yet despite his animus towards the government, De Quincey wishes to shift the 
ground of the argument away from the nature opium as a drug and commodity, arguing that 
there is “a ground for war which is currently growing more urgent; a ground which would 
survive all the disputes about opium, and would have existed had China been right in those 
disputes from the beginning to end” (534). He argues in a series of powerful metaphors that 
China is completely “Other” to Britain (and the west), and that the legal systems of the two 
polities are antithetical and thus incompatible, as has been demonstrated time and time again: 
“The Chinese laws do not change. It is the very expression of their improgressive state that 
they cannot” (189). De Quincey argues that the emperor is a “sovereign who affects to make 
a footstool of the terraqueous globe, and to view all foreigners as barbarians, could not be 
approached with advantage by a body of manly Englishmen’ (548; Kitson “Dark Gift”, 56-
82.) Here De Quincey departs from the consensus of British debate about the war, including 
that invoked by Macaulay, and develops his notion of an organic nation state, epitomised by 
the British nation, and opposed to the Qing empire which is a mere assemblage of parts, with 
no essential organic unity. He declares, among other things, that the Chinese are “incapable 
of a true civilization, semi-refined in manners and the mechanic arts, but incurably savage in 
the moral sense,” they are “conceited,” “rascally,” “inorganic,” “stagnant,” “improgressive,” 
“lazy,” “torpid,”  “sedentary,”   “wicked,” “vindictive,” “cruel,”  “bestial,” “full of insolence, 
full of error, needing to be enlightened, ” and, above all,  “something to be kicked.” They are 
“ultrapusillanimous,” and “the vilest and silliest among nations.” (554, 541, 542, 546, 550, 
552, 553, 554, 557, 559, 561, 562). De Quincey’s arguments against the Qing Empire are 
couched in the language of Ricardian economics and the conventions of trade and diplomacy, 
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but for him, China is a simply an aberrant state, the antithesis of the European nation state, 
established since the Thirty Years War unfied by religion (Christianity) and language: 
 
The English navy might as reasonably throw bomb-shells into the crater of Vesuvius, 
by way of bidding it be quiet, or into the Kingdom of the birds above us, as seek to 
make any deep impression on such a vast callous hulk as the Chinese Empire. It is 
defended by its essential non-irritability, arising out of the intense non-development of 
its resources. Were it better developed, China would become an organized mass—
something to be kicked, but which cannot kick again—having no commerce worth 
counting, no vast establishments of maritime industry, no arsenals, no shipbuilding 
towns, no Portsmouths, Deals, Deptfords, Woolwiches, Sunderlands, Newcastles, 
Liverpools, Bristols, Glasgows, -- in short, no vital parts, no organs, no heart, no lungs 
(542-3). 
 
De Quincey represents the China state as not an organic, unified nation as such, but rather as 
a body possessing no nervous system, no vital organs, in fact not a body as we understand it,  
or, if so it is so physiologically coarser and developed than that of the European. De Quincey 
here emphasizes China’s lack of maritime and military infrastructure. In fact, the Chinese 
GDP in the 1840s was still much higher than that of all the European states combined. The 
Jesuit, Du Halde, had judged in 1735, that trade within China was vastly greater than that of 
all Europe combined, and Adam Smith famously declared in his The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) that China was “a country richer than any part of Europe” (Smith 2: 202). Certainly, 
China’s prosperity was still legendary, leading Robert Markley to describe its enormous 
riches and revenues as a representing to the eighteenth-century European imagination a 
confrontation with “a kind of socioeconomic sublime” (Markley, 75, 110).  
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 De Quincey must have known this, yet he chose to present his readership with a China 
that was lacking in modernity. He denounces the Chinese empire as a “callous hulk” 
defended by “its essential non-irritability” or inability to flex its muscles. China requires the 
stimulation of modern trade, including that of opium, in much the same way as a lethargic 
body requires the stimulations of opium or tea to excite it (Leask, 170-228). It must be 
stimulated into action by a violent kicking, administered by British colonial and maritime 
forces. The symptoms of its imperial bodily torpor consist in the empire having no 
international commerce and no participation in a global commerce. De Quincey racializes 
commerce here, arguing that China’s lack of commercial activity results not from the stage of 
society which it has reached, but from the stereotypical moral characteristics associated with 
the oriental races in general. The romantic metaphor of the organic body politic is easily 
applied to the individual case. De Quincey sees China as ambivalently barbaric, in that it has 
degenerated from civilization and is morally savage. China is poised somewhere between 
savagery and barbarism, “incapable of a true civilization, semi-refined in manners and 
mechanic arts, but incurably savage in the moral sense’ (552, 554).  
 De Quincey’s contribution to the debate about First Opium War is to prescribe for all 
‘Oriental powers’ like China in a disturbing pedagogic metaphor, “a full explanation of our 
meaning under an adequate demonstration of our power.” The efficacy of this will depend 
upon “our visible demonstration of our power contrasted with our extreme forbearance in 
using it” (193). In his war policy, De Quincey is closest to the bellicose British opium traders, 
such as William Jardine, James Matheson or Hugh Hamilton Lindsay. His essay, however 
suspiciously we regard it in ethical terms, is a tour de force, a highly knowledgeable, highly 
stylised, rhetorically powerful piece that combines detailed contemporary political satire on 
the Whig government, with an application of Ricardian economics, and an extremely 
mischievous and unreliable irony, very much a Blackwood’s essay and one to be approached 
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with extreme critical caution. It should not be regarded as a statement by a representative 
nineteenth-century public voice or as the quintessentially romantic view of China and the 
orient. This essay has tried to show how the essay is complexly imbricated with De 
Quincey’s personal life, his own opium habit, his Tory politics, as well as his dark jealousy of 
Macaulay. Always a writer who could develop an intriguing metaphor, De Quincey came to 
regard regarded the First Opium War later in life as a turning point from which “the great 
social swell, the restlessness, and the billowy state of insurrectionary uproars that have 
agitated China ever since” owe their origin. Borrowing a figure from Milton’s Paradise Lost 
in 1857, he recounts how the archangel Ithuriel’s spear dislodged Satan from the body of a 
toad and how “Great Britain, the Ithuriel of 1842” has simply reversed this trope: “that 
which, under old traditional superstitions, had masqueraded as a warrior angel, collapsed, at 
one touch of the mighty spear, into a bloated toad” (De Quincey, China, 36-7). The chief 
architect of the war and devoted Miltonist, Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay, who would die 
just two years later on 28th December 1859 only three weeks after his older and darker 
nemesis, the “opium eater,” would surely have approved the comparison. 
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